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June 08, 2011
June 09, 2011
November 05, 2008
December 07, 2011
December 28, 2011
With a week to go until the February 21 February 28 deadline* for the
second round of Secretary Duncan’s ESEA Waiverpalooza, states nationwide are
studying the results of Round One to figure out what federal officials did—and
didn’t—approve. And they are asking themselves a question: Is it even worth it?
(A few states—including California
have already decided: no.)
In the end, I suspect that most of the 28 states that have
indicated an interest in a waiver will file for one, if only because, by this
point, they’ve already sunk thousands of man-hours and tens of thousands of
dollars into the process. And some of the flexibility provided by the feds to
the first ten approved states is for real—getting rid of the “100 percent
proficient by 2014” deadline; allowing all Title I schools to spend their
dollars in a “schoolwide” manner; eliminating the ill-designed supplemental
services program; ending the “highly qualified teachers” mandate.
But what about the accountability policies at the heart of
No Child Left Behind? Just how much leeway did the Administration actually
provide? Let’s consider three big problems with current law, and whether the
waiver process fixed them.
A few leading
states—I’m thinking of Colorado especially—have leapfrogged several generations
by focusing on the performance trajectories of individual students, rather than
looking at different cohorts of kids over time. In the Colorado system, the goal is for schools to
put their students on a course to be college and career ready by the end of
high school. That creates strong incentives for schools to accelerate the progress
of kids who are far behind, while paying attention to kids at the middle and
top of the performance spectrum, too. This makes perfect sense, right?
Not according to the bean counters on Maryland Avenue.
They insisted that Colorado
add to its system of annual targets for getting a certain number of students to
“proficiency”—with the expectation that an increasing number of kids would
reach that target every year.
But that’s Accountability 1.0 thinking. Why do
we care about how this year’s fourth graders perform versus last year’s fourth
graders? Or whether more fourth graders reached “proficient”? What matters is
whether kids are on track for college and career readiness—and whether students
make enough progress over the school year to get them onto this trajectory. At
least in the Colorado
case, the feds have taken an elegant and rational system and made it more
complicated and convoluted.
No Child Left Behind
played a critical role in exposing the achievement gaps that plague so many of
our schools. Continuing to demand transparency around subgroup performance
makes eminent sense. But requiring that accountability systems be explicitly
race-based is problematic, especially as the conception of “race” continues to
change and an increasing number of students view themselves as multiracial.
Furthermore, policies that encourage schools to literally “narrow the gap”
enshrine in public policy the notion that we are rooting for white, Asian, and
affluent students to do worse, or at least do no better. This is nuts. Yet if
anything, the waiver process has exacerbated this problem.
Back to Colorado.
Its focus on individual performance mitigates the need for subgroups because it
creates strong incentives for schools to focus on their lowest achievers, many
of whom belong to one or more of the various subgroups. (These kids generally
have to make a LOT of progress to be on track
for college and career readiness.) But that wasn’t enough for the Department;
Uncle Sam wanted subgroup accountability, too.
Or consider Florida. Its longstanding accountability
system includes a weight for the growth of a school’s lowest performing
quartile. This excellent provision is another way to pressure schools to pay
attention to their educationally neediest kids. So how did this system fare
with federal officials? Not well. The same bean-counters (or peer reviewers, or
both, it’s hard to be sure) demanded that Florida promise to intervene in schools
that get positive school ratings – A’s and B’s even – if one or more of their
subgroups isn’t up to par. But they can only get A’s or B’s if their low
performing students are making strong progress. Bottom line: Florida got overruled.
biggest complaint about No Child Left Behind was that it over-identified
schools and districts as failing, meaning that the very worst institutions—the
full-blown dropout factories—got lost in the mix. So one goal of the waiver
process is to bring the number of failing schools down to a more realistic
Then try to explain the feds’
reaction to Tennessee’s
proposal. In its explanation of the changes that Tennessee made to its original proposal, the
Department of Education boasted that “based on data from the 2010-2011 school
year, 105 of 135 districts would be identified.” And this is a good thing?
The feds also bragged that
Minnesota agreed (under pressure, one assumes) to drop the “safe harbor”
provision from its accountability system—meaning schools that have low
proficiency rates but are making great progress will no longer escape the
“failing schools” label. What’s the point of that?
So again, is
“flexibility” worth it? For states hoping to adopt next-generation
accountability systems—those that move beyond the poor design choices of No
Child Left Behind—the answer appears to be no. But hey, getting rid of the
highly qualified teachers mandate is nice.
* Update: The deadline for the second round of ESEA waivers, originally February 21, was pushed back to February 28.